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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of fiscal policies in an openeconomy when
international financial markets are well developed. Consumers use these
markets to hedge against the risk of uncertain future changes ingovernment
policies. These portfolio allocations alter the effects of changes in
government policies, if and when they occur, as compared to a world with more
limited financial markets. Three examples are discussed. The first involves
a change in (productive) government spending, financed by a change in
lump—sum taxes, in a large open economy with two goods. The second example
concerns the effects of temporary changes in distorting taxes. The final
example concerns the open—economy effects of changes in government deficits,
due to changes in lump-sum taxes, without Ricardian equivalence. In each
example the existence of opportunities to trade on well—developed
international financial markets is shown to alter, in importantways, the
effects of changes in government policies. The empirical significance of
these differences should grow as international financial markets continue to
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1.Introduction
The development of internationalfinancial markets over thepast several
years (like the development of domesticmarkets in the U.S.j is proceedingat
a recolSd pace. Trade In foreignstocks has risen dramaticajlT in theU.S.
and other countries, as havetrades in foreign corporate andgovernment
bonds: domestic corporationsissue debt denominated inforeign currencies and
sold on foreign markets. Tradein forward and futures marketshas risen and
the marketshaveproliferatedFutures markets on indexes ofassets have
beenformed:options trade has skyrocketed
Finally, currency swaps (and
interest rate swaps) —whichpermit virtually any state-contingent
arrangements -havebecome commonplace
These developments raise manyquestions. What is the source of demand
for these assets? Why have
these markets developed now. andwh did they not
develop earlier? What new opportunitiesfor corporations and individualsdo
thesemarkets offer? This paper discussesone major issueraised by these
developments:the impact of sophisticatedinternational financial marketson
the effects of governmentpolicy. Specifica1lv thispaper concentrates on
the international effects of fiscalpolicies.One Important question the
paper does not address is the nature ofthe transition from a world withless
developed to more developed international
financial markets. Instead, the
papercompares two worlds: one withand one without Sophisticated
international asset markets. Thepaper employs several modelsto make this
comparison:the conclusion that these marketsaffect the results does not
depend on a specific model of fiscalpolicy.International financial markets permit individualsto trade over time and
across prospective states of theworld. By borrowing or lending with their
counterparts In other countries, individuals can.for example. try to
eliminate fluctuations in consumption caused byseasonal or cyclical
variations in domestic output. The extentof their success in this endeavor
depends. in equilibrium. on the timingof similar output fluctuations in
other countries. Intertemporal trade is onefunction of asset markets. In a
world of uncertainty, they have a secondfunction: asset markets permit
individualstohedge against unwanted risk.If domestic output is low in one
state of the world and highin another. individuals can choose a portfolioof
assetswith a positive return in the former stateand a negative return in
the latter state. Future states of theworld can be treated analogously to
future periods of time. The extent towhich domestic individuals can succeed
in smoothing their consumption across statesdepends. in equilibrium. on the
patternofoutput across states in other countries.
Consider a world with two countries that areidentical except for
endowments.Country A receives an endowment of a perishablegood X and
countryB receives a perishable good Y. Identical.infinite—lived.
risk-averseindividuals inhabit these countries. Each has anInstantaneous
utility function U(x)U(y). where x and y are consumptionSof goods N and
V.In a stationary equilibrium country A exportsto B half of its endowment
of'N and imports half of the country B endowmentof Y. Nowintroduce a
simplegovernment policy: the governmentofthe domestic country imposes a
lump—sum tax on domestic residentsand uses the proceeds to make lump—sum
("foreign aid') transfer payments toresidents of the other country. The3
results of this policy, according to an economist using the method of
comparative statics on th model's equilibrium, would be that wealth is
redistributed. Domestic wealth falls and foreign wealth rises. so domestic
consumption of each good falls and foreign consumption rises. Had this
government policy been perfectly anticipated. the results would have been the
same in the absence of international financial markets. The results would
also be the same. in the absence of international financial markets. if
individualshad been uncertain about future government policies. Because
everyone in thedomestic country is identical by assumption, it is impossible
tosell on domestic markets the risk inherent inuncertainty about future
policy.
Suppose that. in this example. there are international financial markets
in noncontingent claims, that is. simple borrowing and lending is allowed.
Uncertainty about future government policy in the domestic country will
induce risk—averse, expected-utility—maximizing domestic individuals to
self—insure by saving. They will consume less X and Y. and save more. in
periodswithout the policy, that is. in periods when the government does not
tax them to provide foreign aid. They will dissave in periods with the
policy, in order to mitigate its effects. Foreigners will consume more in
periods without the policy. in anticipation of possible foreign-aid receipts
in some future period, and dissave in periods with the foreign aid. The size
ofthe change in consumption immediately following the imposition of the
government policy is smaller in the presence of borrowing and lending.
because loan markets permit consumption—smoothing. The magnitude of these
changes in saving and consumption, and of any associated changes in interest4
rates. depends on how expectations of future policy change over time (which
in turn depends on the stochastit process governing the policy), the
curvature of the utility function. etc. Clearly, some self—insurance
possibilities are present because of international capital markets. though
noncontingent claims are inferior to contingent claims for this purpose.
Complete contingent claims would eliminate the effect of the actual
policy on consumption in this example. Because all individuals have the same
information and agree upon the relevant probability distributions in this
example. they will choose to trade in claims, prior to the realization of
policy, that undo" the income transfer from any potential policy. Because
only the domestic government mayimposethis policy, foreigners are wealthier
than domestic residents and will consume more every period, regardless of
whether the domestic government actually makes the transfers. Given the
initial probabilities (at date 0 that the government will make transfers of
particular sizes in various time-periods, actual imposition of a transfer has
no effects whatsoever. introduction of complete international financial
markets. therefore, has major implications regarding the effects of this
policy.
The treatment of government policy as uncertain and exogenous deserves
some comment. The assumption of exogeneity is inessential. though it
corresponds to questions economists frequently ask. such as "what would be
the effects of a rise in taxes?" Government policy might well be the outcome
of a political equilibrium with inputs such as lobbying. voting, and
exogenous shifts in opportunities, which operate through political
institutions that constrain bureaucrats. politicians. lobbyists, and voters.0
Generally,such a model will have elements ofrandomness attached to its
inputs. so that resulting policies will beStchastjc Policy can then be
treated as a stochastic process (thatmight be correlated with stochastic
processes on other disturbances to theeconomy). Lucas (1976). and.
subsequently. Coolev, LeRoy. and Raymon (1984a.b)have argued that the
assumption of rational expectations requires thestochastic process on policy
to be specified as part of the environmentof constraints under which
individuals maximize utility.Lucas applied this argument to the investment
tax credit and other policies. Coolev.LeRoy. and Raymon have applied the
argument to policy on the growthrateof the money supply. Stockman and
Dellas (1985) have applied it to tariffs,and Stockman and Hernandez (1985)
toexchange controls. Rather than changinggovernmentpolicy ina way that
individuals thought was impossible whenthey maximized utilit.theeconomist
is constrained to consider changes inpolicies that correspond to the
probability distributions that are part ofa fully specified economic
environmentthat isknown to individuals when they make their choices.2
Withoutinternational financial markets (andabstracting from differences
across individuals within a country), thetreatment of government policies as
outcomes of a stochastic process has no effecton allocations (though it may
affectprices). Given the treatment of futuregovernment policy as part of
the stochastic environment facing individualswhen they make choices, the
availability of international financial markets instate-contingent claims
can have major effects on the results ofpolicies. The next three sections
of the paper present examples of theseeffects on fiscal policies.6
When government policies are not simply redistributions. financial
markets will not simply undo the policies. Generally, pure social gains
and losses from policies will be shared among participants in financial
markets. Distortions introduced by policies. however, cannot be eliminated
by financial markets: substitution effects of policies will continue to
operate. In Stockman and Dellas (1985). for example. the effects of tariffs
are examined In a world with complete international asset markets. In a
two-country. two-good world with trade due to differing endowments. a small
tariff raises consumption of the exportable good and improves welfare in the
absence of financial markets. With these markets. however, a tariff reduces
consumption: consumption of both goods is lower with a domestic tariff and no
foreign tariff than with a foreign tariff and no domestic tariff. The
existence of contingent assets. therefore. has a major impact on the positive
implications of the theory. The results obtain from the ability of these
assets to eliminate income effects of changes in policy (as individuals
spread wealth optimally across prospective states of the world), leaving
substitution effects inplace.Rosen's (1985) survey of implicit contracts
in labor economics makes a similar point about optimal contractual
arrangements.
The following sections present three examples in which the effects of
fixed policy in an open economy are altered by the existence of sophisticated
international financial markets. Section 2 examines a change in government
spending under the assumptions that this spending play is productive and that
nondistorting taxes are varied to maintain a balanced budget. Section 3examines changes in distorting taxes holding fixed the government s budget
deficit. Finally. section 4 examines changes in the budget deficit inan
overlapping-generation model without Ricardian-equivalence.
2. Government Spending and International Financial Markets
This section discusses the effects of increases in domestic government
expenditures. financed by increases in lump sum taxes on domestic residents.
in a two—country world with complete contingent internationalasset markets.
and contrasts the results to those in the absence of these markets.
Government spending can serve a variety of roles. and the effects of
fiscal policy differ depending upon the type ofgovernment expenditures
analyzed. This section develops a simple illustrative model of the
international effects of changes in productive government expenditure.e.g.
on infrastructure. A key element of the model is that this productive
expenditure does not affect all goods in the same way. The effects ofa
change in government spending are shown to depend on the availability of
international asset markets.
Consider a two—country world in which the domestic country is endowed
with a tradeable good X and the foreign country is endowed witha tradeable
good V. There is a representative, risk-averse, expected—utility-maximizing
individual in each country who has instantaneous utility function13(x) —
V(y).Purchases or consumption of' X require a productive input to reduce
"transactions costs" that use up real resources. Theymay include costs of
shipping the good to its location of consumption, costs of consuming the
good. or costs of household production such as preparation. etc. It is8
simplest to assume that X. besides being a consumption good. is a productive
input into this 'transactions" activity. X can be used privately by an
individual to produce transactions services, or it can be used by the
government to produce a public good that has a positive marginal product for
transactions services. One might think of X as system of roads and bridges.
police and security services, courts to enforce criminal law. or other
productive public goods. These public goods interact with private production
of transactions services and lower privatecostsof a given volume of
transactions. Let g be thelevelof government expenditure on these items
(andneglectall other government spending). Individuals who wish to consume
units of X must purchase x09(g) units of X. where 9-1 >0of the goods are
used for transactions services and the rest are consumed. Theproductivity
of government expenditures motivates the conditions 9' <0and 9" >0.
Therepresentativeindividual in the domestic country maximizes expected
utility of consumption of X and Y in each state of the world z. x(z) and





subject to the budget constraint.9
(2)
Jp(z-p(z)9(z)x(z)-q(z)y(z)-p(z)gdz
where X is the (state-independent) endowment of good X. and p(z) andq(z) are
domestic present-value state prices of X and V at date t. e.g. ifz0 is a
possible value of z at date t. thenPizot) is the present—value (period zero)
price of X in state z0 at date t in the domestic country. The time
subscripts on the functions inside the integral have been suppressed. This
formulation permits complete markets within the country. In the absence of
complete international financial markets. state prices may differ across
countries. For simplicity. I abstract from all uncertainty except that which
enters through future government policy. The state vector can be written as
(3) z =(g.g*)
whereg and g* are the levels of government expenditure in the two
countries. The public-good aspects of government spending do not extend
outside national boundaries, by assumption, so 9 depends only ong and 9*
depends only on g*: these functions will be written 9(g) and e*(g*).
The representative individual in the foreign country has a similar
maximization problem, though his utility function may be different and his





where stars denote foreign variables. While foreign and domestic state
prices may differ in the absence of complete international financialmarkets.
arbitrageinthe goods market on a state-by—state basis guarantees that the
relativepriceof X in termsof Vin each state isequal across countries.
i.e. p(zLq(z)p*(Z)q(Z) foreveryz.
In absence of international financial markets. equilibrium requires that
in whateverstate of the worldmaterializes,world supply and demand are






In.addition, equilibrium in domestic asset markets (and similarly in foreign
asset markets) requires that demands and supplies of state-contingent assets
are equal. Because everyone is alike within a country. there are no net11
trades on these domestic asset markets. However, theequilibrium conditions
can be used to price assets, that is, to find theprices at which individuals
are satisfied with zero net trades. If asset prices differacross countries
so that for some z, p(z-)p*(z) or q(z)q*(z), then there are private
gains from trade. on international asset markets.
Necessary conditions for utility maximization in each country and
equilibrium conditions in the goods markets give three equations, for each
date t, in domestic consumption of each good and, with the normalizationq =





Foreign allocations can then be determined from equilibrium conditions.
Using the last equation to eliminate the price, the system reduces to two
equations in two unknowns. Comparative statics can be used to determine the
effects of changes in government spending in eithercountry. An increase in
government spending may move the economy toward or away from thesocially
efficient level of spending. An increase in governmentspending in the
domestic country raises domestic consumption of X byIxO'dgf for any given
gross domestIc purchases of X; the cost is dg units of X. The socially12
optimal level of X is. therefore. implicitly given by xe' =—1.Similarly.
the socially optimal level of foreign government spending is given implicitiy
by x*9*I =-1.The analysis of changes in government spending is simplified
by consideration of changes In g or g* around the socially optimalpoints.3
The results of total differentiation arethen4
(8a) dx =(l'(n1T5-24))(n35dg —7r26dg*).
and




7r2 E-y9V'1(v) -9V'(y) 0.
Ey9\''(y) <0.
7T4 - ex_g)u*1u(x*!e* -OU*I(x*)
l (*) —e*V*I(y*)<0.and
7r6y9*'\T*'(y*)< 0.
Thesign of ir2 depends on the elasticity of the domestic marginal utility of
consumption of imports. If r —yV''/V' =1then ir2 =0.In that case. a
rise in domestic government expenditures unambiguously increases domestic
consumption of exportables. and reduces the foreign consumption of that good.
Even with a separable utility function (LTV). the increase in domestic
government spending may affect domestic imports. For example. if rand r *
y x
E _x*C*/U*I are both equal to one. then 1T2=0but ir4> 0.so a rise in
domestic governmentspendingincreases domestic imports as well as13
consumption of exportables, For smallenough r*. imports will fall withan
increase in government spending.A rise in foreign governmentspending
leaves domestic consumption ofexportabjes unchanged ifr, =1.and increases
or decreases x as r is greater thanor less than one. Ifr is close to
one. then an increase in foreign
government spending unambiguously raises
domestic Imports. The effects ofchanges in government spending frequently
depend on the curvature of the utilityfunctions, even when the utility
functjon is separable. As I will showbelow, these ambiguities in the theory
are removed once complete internationalfinancial markets are introduced,
Withcomplete international financial markets.state-prices are equated
across countries and equilibriuni conditionsfor assets help determine
allocations ingoodsmarkets as wellasasset prices. World supply of each
good ineachstate (and time) must equal demand,so the previously stated
equilibrium conditions must hold for eachz (and t). The equilibriurn
conditions, together withthenecessary conditions for utility maximization.
implythat forevery z.
(10) 7*1(y— y(z))=' V'(y(z))and
(II) U*I((x-x(z)e(g)-g-g*)/9*(g*))=#U'(x(z)) 9*(g*)/9(g),
whereis the ratio of the the marginal utilityof wealth ofthe
representative foreign individual to themarginalutilityof wealth of the
represefltatj'e domestic individual.j.e.themultiplier on(5) divided by the
multiplieron (2). Note that •isafunction of the probability14
distribution F(z). but does not depend onrealized values of g or g*.(10)
and (11) imply that with completeinternational asset markets. consumption of
y is independent of realizationsof z. An econometriclan examining
time—series or cross sectional data would see no responseof y to observed
changes in z.This contrasts with the ambiguousconclusions in the absence
of any international asset markets.
In order to determine the relation betweenincreases in government
spending and allocations, the second equationcan be totally differentiated
(withheld fixed). Letting '(z) =1-x(z)9'(g)and *(z) =
theresult is
9
(12) (—U 8/9* —U#9*9) dx(z)=(_9IUI9*/9*'/9*)dg
(Ub9*'#/8 —.*u*/e*)dg*.
The coefficients on dx(z) is positive.At the socially optimal g and g*. .
=
= 0.In thatcase small changes ing or g* have no first—ordereffects on
economicefficiency,the coefficient on dg is positive, andthe coefficient
on dg* is negative. An increaseindomestic government spending raises
domestic consumption of exportables. while anincrease in foreign government
spending reduces it. Because theseresults are obtained in the neighborhood
of the social optimum. changes in gand g*, have no income effects.
Therefore. an increase in domestic governmentspending reduces foreign
imports. while an increase in foreigngovernment spending raisesthem.6
These results on the effects of changesin productive government expenditure
in the presence of sophisticated
international financial markets contrast
withtheambiguous effects obtained intheir absence.15
3. DIstorting Taxes
The previous section assumed thattaxes were lump sum. This section
examines the effects of changes indistorting taxes with and without
Sophisticated international financialmarkets. As in the previous section.
the results Illustrate thatany effects of policy that operate through
redistributions of wealth are eliminatedby complete international financial
markets. This section applies thatprinciple to a tax on consumption. The
tax might take the form of value-addedtax or an income tax with various
effectivedeductions or credits for saving. Thissection uses a two-country
mode] similar to the one in the lastsection. hut simplified to include only
two time periods the extension tomore is straightforward) and a single
consumption good that is endowed to both countries,then the timing of
endowments differs across countries, thereIs an obvious role for financial
markets: borrowing and lending willfacilitate intertemporal smoothing of
consumption. Suppose that in the first period thehome endowment is small
and the foreign endowment is large.and that this is reversed in thesecond
period. Then the home country will borrow
from the foreign country in the
first period, and repay its loans inthe second period.
This section will examine the effectsof a temporary increase in domestic
consumption taxes in the first period, under
several assumptions about
accompanying changes required by the government'sbudget constraint. In the
absence of international financial marketsother than those for simple.
noncontingent loans, a tax increase has a Substitutioneffect and an Income
effect. Starting from a situation ofequal taxation in the two periods, a
rise Ifl first-period domestic taxes, witha lump-sum refund of the tax16
revenue, reduces the domestic demand for loansand lowers theinterestrate
at which the domestic country borrows. A small increasein taxes reduces
first—period consumption and raises second—period consumption.These results
are changed in the presence of completeinternational financial markets.
Assume the representative individual In the domesticcountry maximizes
(13) EU(c.1—L) --,&J(c'.l—L')
where c and L are consumption and leisure. one unitof time is available each
period, and primes denote second-periodvariables. For simplicity. it will
be assumed that U12 =0(which does not affect the main results butreduces
the algebra involved). Output. y. is a stochasticfunction of labor inputs:
y =L.whereis a positive random variable. Similarly, second-period
output is y' =a'L'.The governmenttaxes consumption at a rate r.Define T
1 —r. Denotethe presentvalue stateprice of goods in statez by pz)
Initially, assume that changes ingovernmentspending accompany changes in
taxes. and that such spending is neutral (it Isuseless or it affects utility
inaseparable way). Changesin gand tax revenue areequal.Then the




(15) z E(a.a*. T, T*. a'. a*' T'. T*I)IT
indexes states of the world, with starsdenoting foreign variables.
Implicitly, c. L. c'. L'. and p are functionsof z.
The foreign country has an analogousdescription that will not be
repeated here. In the absence of
state-contingent international assets, but
with noncontingent international loansmarkets, the budget constrai can be
Simplified. The simplification reflects thezero net trades on internal
asset markets due to the representativeagent assumption. The budget
constrajit with only noncontingent internationalloans is effectively
(16) aL -Tc—p(&L'—T'c')=0.






(17b) — = c'—c g'
Together with the necessary conditions forutility maximization by
individuals in each country. who chooseconsumption and leisure in each
period, this generates a set of equations witha solution that depends on the
concavity of utility and the relative sizes of variousexogenous terms. The
main elements of the solution for thiscase (with only noncontingent18
International loans) can be illustrated by assuming that labor supplies are
fixed at unity. so countries receive stochastic endowments. a and a*. Then




(18)follows from maximization of (13) subject to (16). and (19) follows from
the analogous foreign maximization problem along with (17) and the
balanced-budget assumption. Recall that government spending varies with tax
revenue: dg =cdT-(T-1)dc.
Consider a realization ofand a' for which cg <ain equilibriun:.
This would happen if. for example. the countries are identical ex ante. if
(a.a*) and (a.a*') are independently drawn. g=g*. and the realized value of
a* exceedsthat of a.Then the domestic country is a net borrower in the
first period. Differentiation of (18)—(19) shows that (as long as c—a is not
too large) an increase in first—period domestic taxes reduces private
consumption but has an Indeterminate effect on aggregate demand and the
interest rate because of the increase in government purchases. Second period
consumption.
(20) c' =(a' R(a—Tc))/T',
is also Indeterminate. It depends on the direction of the interest rate
change and the magnitudes of the substitution and wealth effects.:19
The effects of a consumption taxare changed when individuals haveaccess
to complete international financialmarkets. Then the equilibrium conditions
(17) must hold on a state-by-state basis.
These conditions, and the
necessary conditions for utility maximization ineach country. imply
(21) U*1[a,L(z)*L*(z)_g_g*_0()} =U1(c(z)) T*/T.
(22) U1c(z)) /U2(l—L(z)) =T/a.
(23)
/U2*(l_L*tz))T*,a* and
(24) Tr(z)E1(C(z)) / p(z)T =arbitraryconstant
for allz.In these equations. •isthe ratio of the foreign marginal
utilityofwealth to the domestic marginal utility ofwealth (a ratio of
multiplierson the wealth constraints ).andthe constant in the last equation
is arbitrary because one of the stateprices can be normalized without loss
of'generality.Thefirstthree sets of'equations (for each z). (2fl—(23).
determine production, trade, andconsumption, and (24) then determines state
prices, Another set of equations, identicalin form to these. describes the
solution for equilibrium in the secondperiod.
-Totaldifferentiation of (2i.)—(24) yields theeffects of a high
realizationof domestic taxes in the firstperiod. compared toanother state
witha lower realization of domestic taxes, Thiscomparison, across
alternativerealizations of taxes. requires thatbe held fixed. because20
is a function only of the probability distributions and other parametersof
the model. not of subsequent realizations of random variables. Note that if
L and L* are fixed. so that the model Is one with endowments. then (21)
alone, along with the government budget constraint, determines the effect of
a change in taxes on consumption. In that case. an increaseIn T lowers
domestic consumption and may raise or lower foreign consumption depending on
the magnitude of the substitution effect in the domestic country from the
tax. The change in T. however, leaves second—period consumptionunaffected
in each country. This result contrasts with the implication of themodel
without state—contingent international asset markets.
With endogenous production, domestic and foreign output move in the same
direction, regardless of whether output rises because of the increased demand
by the government or falls because of the reduced demand by domestic
individuals.
'(Thisresult is. however, sensitive to the assumption that
utility is separable in goods and leisure.) Unlike the case in which
internationalfinancial markets are limited to noncontingent bonds. a change
intaxesandgovernmentspending inthefirst period leaves output in each
country unaffected in the second period.
The assumption that government spending has no effect on marginal
utilitiesof other goods is extreme. Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985)
have estimated that roughly one-third of government consumption can be
treated as if it were private consumption. It is straightforward to examine
the implications of the model if government spending is a direct substitute
for private spending. Consider the extreme case in which instantaneous
utility depends on leisure and on cg. the sum of private and government21
consumption. As long as g is below the level ofconsumption that would be
chosen privately, this is equivalent toa lump-sum transfer to the public of
the revenue obtained from the consumption tax.(Individuals effectjveJ'
obtain this transfer by reducing privateexpenditure on the good as
government expenditure rises. )Assume also that the countries are identical
ex ante.In this case. an increase in first-period domestictaxes
unambiguously reduces output in each country, reduces domesticconsumption.
and raises foreign consumption,8 Intuitively,complete international capital
markets eliminate the direct income effects of thepolicy, but leave the
Substitution effect. Higher consumption taxes reduce domesticdemand in the
first period. If world output were unchanged.as in the endowment model.
then consumption in the foreign country wouldunambiguously rise. Foreign
individuals attempt to spread this gain to current leisure.and to future
consumption and leisure. Asset trades have previously guaranteed thatany
increase in consumption of goods or leisure. not dueto a substitution
effect, will be shared by foreign and domestic individuals.The net result
is an increase inforeign consumption, and decreases in output in each
countryassociated with the fall in domestic consumption. In thiscase. an
increaseingovernment spending and taxes hasa contractionary effect on
output in each country. a contractionarv effect on domesticconsumption. and
an expansionary effect on foreign consumption.
4. Budget Deficits without Debt Neutrality
In this section I build upon the work by Frenkel and Razin(1986) on the
international transmission of budget deficits, Frenkel andRazin apply22
Blanchard s (1985) model of uncertain lifetimes to analyze theinternational
implications of fiscal policies, and demonstrate that in theabsence of
Ricardian equivalence, government budget deficits may increasedomestic
aggregate demand but can be transmitted negatively tothe rest of the world.
decreasing foreign aggregate demand. This section takesthe Frenkel-Razin
modelas a point of departure. and introduces completeinternational
financial markets. subject to the natural limitation that the unborn cannot
trade inthesemarkets. The results indicate that in the presence of these
assetmarkets. the effects of deficits on the current account and other
variables is very different than in their absence.
I follow the setup of Frenkel and Razin. There are two countrieswith
representative individual consumers (in equal numbers) and two governments.
A single good is endowed to these two countries, and the endowmentsfollow an
exogenous stochastic process. The descriptionof the two countries is
identical: each country is essentially described by Blanchard's model.
Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. Individualsface a fixed
probability of death in each period, regardless of age.denoted (1-c).where
a is the survival—probability. They contract with life—insurancecompanies.
which collect an individual s assets and liabilities upon his death.Yaari
(1965) discusses the equivalence between these companies and a setof annuity
and bond markets.A transversality condition requires that the limit (as
the length of his life goes to infinity) of the present value of' net assets
is nonnegative. so an individual does not borrow an unrestricted amountin
the expectation that the life-insurance company will bail him outwhen he
dies. Insurance companies are perfectly competitive and operate costlessly23
sothat insurance pretnia areproportional factors equal to theprobabilityof
death. Under these assumptions, andwith denoting the present value price
of a good at date t.
_1'a is one plus the one-period interest rate at t—i.
is one plus the life-insurancepremium at t—l. and the gross interest
rate (including the insurance premium)faced by an individualis
t—l t —1
. . 'a
) .Thediscount factor is fixed at 6 and utilityis
time—separable and instantaneously logarithmic:individuals maximize expected
utility,Following Blanchard. aggregate consumption Isthen
(25) C =(1—06)
where is aggregate wealth, which equalsdiscounted disposable personal
income (discounted with thegross interest rate) minus private debt. In
general, in the Frenkel—Razin analysis. theprobabilities of death. discount
rates. etc. maydifferacross countries, It will be convenient here.though.
to focus on the simplest case in which allthese parameters are equal across
Countries.
Governments in each country finance anexogenous stochastic process of
spending, which has no effect on productionor any marginal rates of
or marginal utilities, with either taxesor debt. The
government, which lives forever, discounts ata rate that does not
in'corporate an insurance premium. Thepresent value of spending plus initial
government debt equals the present value of taxes.
The equilibrium condition in the worldgoods market at t=O is24
(26) (l—) (l—&o) -g.g*yy*.















where PV0(x) denotes the present value at date 0 of subsequentvalues of x.
using the gross private discount factor. Bg is governmentdebt at date 0(so
thatfuture tax liabilities and government debt are both includedin wealth).
and B0 is net indebtedness at t=0 of the domestic consumers to foreign
consumers. To keep matters as simple as possible. I assumethat this initial
private indebtedness is zero. that government debt is equalin each country.
thatcurrent government spending is equal ineach country. andthat the
probability distribution of future government spending is the samein the
two countries.
Following Frenkel and Razin. dates after t=0 are assumed tohave, with
probability one. some constant levels of government spending. taxes.and
outputs (which. while they are constant for t=l.2.3 may differ from the
values at t=0). Then the present value function is PV0(x) =x1oR/(1—oR)
where x. is the future (t=l,2. .. .) valueof x and R is an average
present—value price. (26)-(28) then determine R and wealthin each country
for given values in each country of government spending. initial government
debt. taxes. output. and initial private indebtedness.25
Now consider a tax cut financed by increasedgovernment borrowing in the
domestic dountry at t=O. Assume that the foreigngovernment has a balanced
budget and that the domestic government budget was balancedprior to the tax
cut. The government budget constraint implies thatdT0 -Rd71/(l—R)
=0
because taxes are raised in all future periods (equally)to offset the
current tax cut. Using this fact. differentiation of (26)-(28) implies that
the tax cut reduces R. i.e. raises the interest rate. raises domesticwealth.
and lowers foreign wealth (see Frenkel and Razin).
Consider now an extension of this analysis to Incorporatecomplete
international financial markets. The results above apply to a world inwhich
individuals can trade on annuity markets with other residents of thesame
country(recall that the "insurance companies' are essentially annuityand
bondmarkets), but they are unable to trade in contingent international
financialmarkets.9 In particular.suppose that it is possible to trade
assets whose returns are contingent on the level of domestic taxes. and other
assets whose returns are contingent on foreign taxes. Then the risk of tax
changes in either country can be shared internationally. Generations whoare
not yet born are unable to trade on these markets. In the absence of
state—contingent international financial markets, domestic wealth (of
currently-living individuals) rises and foreign wealth falls from a cut in
domestic taxes, while the reverse results from a cut in foreign taxes.In
either case, the wealth of the unborn in the country with the tax cut also
falls. Starting from this situation. domestic and foreign Individualscan
agree on mutually beneficial exchanges in which domestic individuals make
payments if there is a cut in domestic taxes and receive payments if there is26
a cut in foreign taxes. For simplicity, assume that the probability
distributions of future taxes are identical inthetwo countries. Because I
have also assumed that tastes. horizons, government spending. and wealth are
the same in the two countries, this makes the two countries symmetric ex
ante. and these payments will equal exactly half of the tax cuts. Similarly.
individuals in each country gain expected utility from sharing the risk of
the subsequent tax increases associated with a current tax cut. With the
symmetry assumptions. all individuals, regardless of nationality, willshare
in thehigher future domestic taxes associated with a tax cut: this occurs
through liabilities that willheexchanged prior to the realization of
policy. Domestic and foreign individuals can share the risks by exchanging
obligationsso that half of any tax cut (or increase) gets paid to (by)
individuals in theothercountry (who. like domestic individuals,areliable
fortaxes for each year they are alive. but only those years)
Given these financial trades that result in asset market equilibrium, a
tax cut in either country increases wealth of currently—living individuals in






wherey =vineach period and B=5.Allindividuals currently alive
gO go
gainequally from a domestic tax cut. With the symmetry assumptions, the tax
cut has no effect on the current account. though the interest rate rises due
to the increase inaggregatedemand. The rise intheinterest rate reduces
thequantitydemanded to the level of the fixed supply of goods and. in
equilibrium,the current consumption of each individual is unaffected.27
The currently unborn in thedomesticcountry suffer a fall in wealth front
a domestic tax cut at date zero.The loss cannot be shared with the
currently unborn in the foreigncountry because none can participate in
financial markets. The increaseddebt sold by the domesticgovernment at
date zero, when it cut taxes,
was purchased in equal amounts by bothforeign
and domestic individuals.Therefore, the increased domesticgovernment debt
Is distributed throughout theworld. As currently living individualsage and
die. they sefl debt to newgenerations. As older individuals selldebt to
younger ones, the life-cycle path ofconsumption is tilted: the young consume
less and the old consumemore. This tilting is permanent, andraises the
real interest rate. The higherreal interest rate. in turn, lowersthe
present value of future labor income andtends to reduce wealth. On the
other hand, the additionalgovernment debt enters positively intowealth.
Domestic individuals who were bornafter the tax cut differ fromforeign
individualsborn after thetax cut in one respect:the former must pay the
higher domestic taxes. Consequentlywhether foreign wealth risesor falls
inthe new steady state, domesticwealth is smaller than foreign wealth.
Essentially world wealthincludes government bonds but doesnot include the
fullpresent value of the taxes associatedwith those bonds. This. alone.
raises world wealth. But althoughthe bonds are held by foreignas well as
domestic Individuals, only the latterpay the higher taxes in the future.
Therefore, at the original interest
rate, foreign wealth rises and domestic
wealth may rise or fall. Thetilting of consumption as the additionaldebt
is passed across generationsraises the interest rate and lowersthe present
value of any given income stream,so the higher interest rate reduceswealth28
in each country. Combining these two
effects. a domestic tax cut has an
indeterminate effect on steady statewealth in each country. though foreign
wealth rises by more (or falls by less)than domestic wealth.
The international impact of a domestic taxcut in the short run and
during the transition to a new steadystate is markedly different in the
presence of completeinternational financial markets. thoughthe steady—state
effects are not altered in kind. Althoughthis example has assumed complete
markets. one may expect that similar
results apply to a world in which asset
markets are more limited but still offer someopportunities for
te—contingent trade. The presenceof money and nominal bonds. for
example. would introduce an assetwith a state_contingent real return.
5. ConclusiOnS
This paper has presented examples
of changes in the international effects
of fiscal policies that can result fromthe existence of sophisticated
internationalfinancialmarkets. The examples have assumedcomplete markets.
In many historical circumstances.it would be unrealistic to assumethat
these markets were available toindividuals either directly or indirectly
through multinational corporations or
financial intermediaries. However, the
rapid development of these marketsmakes it useful to examine their effects.
The proper model for any empiricalapplication would depend upon whether
those markets are available in thattime period or set of countries. The
complete markets framework is auseful benchmark case. While the assumption
of complete markets is unrealistic, sois the more common assumption that
there are no markets for contingentclaims. For many purposes. it is not29
clear that economists should have much confidence in the implications of
theoretical models, or interpretations of economic statistics, that ignore
these markets.
International financial markets remove some of the ambiguities associated
with opposing income and substitution effects, lead to models with stronger
predictions, and in some cases reverse the effects of policies. These
markets also tend to eliminate Intrinsic dynamics that would otherwise occur
through asset accumulation. (Dynamics could stIll be extrinsic or occur
through other channels.) This is probably desirable, given that variations
In real exchange rates exhibit very little dynamics and, instead, seem to be
associated with "news".
The examples in this paper have treated policy as exogenous. A model
that explains why particular economic policies are chosen by the political
process could be incorporated into the examples. Because gainers and 1osers
from economic policies are affected by financial markets, the model of policy
formulation will also be affected.
There are many other fiscal policies, besides those examined above, whose
effects would be altered by the ability of households to trade in financial
markets. Personal and corporate income taxes, with provisions for
miscellaneous deductions, credits, and exclusions, may have very different
effects in the presence of financial markets without them. The effects of
Increased uncertainty about future taxes -overalllevels, the
cross—sectional distribution of taxes, and the timing of taxation -willbe
affected by the ability of Individuals to use financial markets to hedge this
risk. The issue of changes in uncertainty raises an important question:30
which variations in government policy can be hedged by financial markets and
which cannot? With rational expectations and complete markets. individuals
could hedge against allchangesin future policies -includingchanges in
"policy regimes." Which. if any. changes in policy (or rules' or "regimes'
are individuals unable to insure against? For example. could a
decision—maker in government choose to make policy decisions diverge
systematically from the probability distribution governing these policies
that is implicit in financial markets? Orwouldthese implicit probability
distributions always incorporate the possibility that the decision-maker
would attempt to make decisions inthis way?These are not academic.
metaphysical issues. but substantive questions that are directly related to
the effects of fiscal 'andother) policies iii the presenceof contingent
internationalfinancial markets31
Notes
*AlanC. Stockman is Associate Professor of Economicsat the
University of Rochester and a Research Associate ofthe National Bureau of
Economic Research.
**Ihave benefited by comments from Andrew Abel.Patrick Kehoe. and
Jacob Frenkel. This research wassupported by National Science Foundation
Grant SES-8309576.
1.1 do not want to (or need to. in thispaper) take a stand on whether
Coolev. LeRoy. and Raymon are expandingon Lucas's point or are. as they
believe, in disagreement with some of what Lucassays.
2. This does not imply that individuals haveperfect knowledge of all
parameters in the model. it does imply. though, thatindividuals "know that
they don t know' certain things.
3. Given foreign consumption of X andforeign government spending.
domestic consumption if maximized byg such that xe'=-i. Andrew Abel has
correctly pointed out in his comments that while theworld social optimum is
characterized by Xe'= x*9*I=—1.this may not be the optimum for either
country individually. Changes in g or g* around some othervalue that might
describe the equilibrium of a policygame between the two countries involve
additional ambiguities in the results. The additionalterms reflect changes
1n the distortion caused by not havinggovernment spending at the optimal
level for the world.32










whichreduces to (8) and (9) if Xe' =X0K'=1.
5.Letting A and ) be the domestic and foreign marginal utilities of
wealth. necessary conditions for maximization of (1.) subject to (2) include.








Dividing these equations. noting thatstate prices are equated
internationally so p(z) =p*(z)and q(z) =q*(z).and using equiibriun!
conditions to eliminate x*z) and y*(z). yields(101 and (11). where
A*'A.
6.If i0 then thecoefficientondgincludes an additional term.
This term is negative if '>0.reflecting an inefficiently large g. or
positive if ','<0. reflecting a suboptimalg .A change in g away from the
social optimum increases the magitude of the inefficiencyand lowers
consumption of X inbothcountries. Similarly, a change in g toward the
optimum reduces the Inefficiency and raisesconsumption of X in both
countries, This is evident from the fact that thecoefficients on dg and dg*
in (12) have terms involvingor with signs opposite to those of 'r and
.Theseresults illustrate that any income effects from efficiencygains
or losses are shared internationally.
7.ThIs result follows directly from (2iJ—(23). whichimply that
*U2(1-L)/ =
Givenand * (and ). L and L* move together.34
8. Modifying the model so that utility depends on c-g. necessary
conditions for utiJity maximization. equiiibrium conditions, and government

















Using the first two equations to eliminate dc and dc* and solving for di. and
dL* gives










dc* f 1_______________ =
,
2a2U11 2TU35
9. An alternative storyConsistent withtheprevious analysis is that
Individuals do not have rational
expectations about possible changesin
policy, instead attributing
zero Probability to a taxcut).36
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